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Trust in the shadow banking system: ratings agencies and discursive power   
 
 
Introduction 
 
“Like priests in the medieval church, ratings agencies representatives spoke the 
equivalent of financial Latin, which few in their investor congregation actually understood. 
Nevertheless, the congregation was comforted by the fact that the priests appeared to confer 
guidance and blessings. Such blessings, after all, made the whole system work: the AAA 
anointment enabled SIVs to raise funds, banks to extend loans, and investors to purchase 
complex instruments that paid great returns, all without anyone worrying too much…” (Tett, 
2009; 118).  
 
The purpose of this paper is to consider a less visible form of trust production which led to 
the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. In many ways, the financial crisis was the first to result 
from a breakdown of assurance mechanisms, or generators of trust (Yandle, 2008).  In other 
words, this particular global crisis was, at its core, a crisis of trust. What is also unique, though 
less adequately discussed, is that the global financial crisis was initially triggered not by a loss of 
public trust, but by an internal loss of trust between actors within the financial system itself. I 
refer specifically to the breakdown of trust between visible financial system and the ‘shadow’ 
financial system, the latter representing a sizeable portion of the system that is largely invisible 
to the public eye. For the purpose of this paper, I define organisations as “sites where members 
subject themselves and one another to various practices, where discourse sustains mutually 
reinforcing patterns of power and powerlessness” (Conrad and Haynes, 2001; 65). Power resides 
in these discursive practices, including the organisational knowledge formation and claims about 
it. In his discussion of trust in trans-organisational relations, Bachmann (2001), looks at the 
complex social processes involved in inter-firm relationships, and finds that firms operating 
within national boundaries have a shared world of institutional arrangements which govern the 
forms of trust relevant when engaging in specific relationships with each other.  
I argue here that in the modern financial system, acutely globalised and disembedded from 
national economies, different rules of trust production apply. It is my intention therefore to 
explore the trust structures which allowed a visible financial system – consisting of retail banks, 
insurers and other institutions – to co-exist with a far more complex shadow financial system of 
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special purpose vehicles, hedge funds and unregulated structures through power mechanisms 
created through discursive practices. In order to present these trust structures, I re-assemble the 
financial system as an organisation, sharing a dual trust structure, but with different 
underpinnings in the ‘visible’ and ‘shadow’ elements of the system. Whereas the visible financial 
system is backed by trust imbued by central banks and regulators within national boundaries, the 
shadow system was backed instead by trust produced discursively by global rating agencies.  
Companies operating in today’s global markets are on an increased search for legitimacy, 
building trust among key stakeholders in order to reap increased profits. The task of building 
trust in financial systems is made more challenging now that financial markets are more 
interconnected than ever through technology and 24 hour media. Increasingly, people are doing 
business with people they never see, in transactions that take place instantly. Nowhere is this 
more apparent than in global debt capital markets, where it is credit ratings agencies that aim to 
close the ‘trust at a distance’ gap, which might otherwise hinder fundraising in debt capital 
markets. As world bond markets have increased in size, credit ratings agencies – notably 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch – have operated as voluntary ‘trust guardians’ (Shapiro, 
1987), charging fees to evaluate the risk of organisations which borrow money in capital 
markets, interpreting and assessing the credit worthiness of borrowers, assigning a credit rating 
to their debt instruments and publishing that credit rating for the entire market, so that there is 
transparency to borrowers and lenders alike.  
Credit ratings are translated to investors through symbols, which represent the quality of 
debt issued. It is through these symbols that ratings agencies convert trust into a saleable product, 
automatically creating an active trust market (Zucker, 1986). The ratings scale was simple 
enough for both experts and laypeople to understand. If something was triple A it had minimal 
probability of default if it was triple B or triple C it had far more risk and was therefore less 
trustworthy. When a credit rating agency assigns a debt instrument an AAA rating, it is 
considered a ‘prime’ rating with virtually no chance of loan default. Such clear-cut designations 
were comforting to all market players (Tett, 2009). Since institutions tend to invest more in 
companies with high bond ratings (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2001), the top bond rating issued by 
credit ratings agencies – AAA – is highly desirable. Ratings symbols separate out those 
companies that are trustworthy and those that are untrustworthy, making it simpler and easier for 
borrowers and lenders who have never met to do business with each other. Credit ratings 
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therefore came to act as mnemonics for trustworthiness in the form of credit quality; “put simply, 
“AAA-rated companies don’t default” (Partnoy, 1999; 635-636).  
Although trust is considered crucial to success, there are few coherent concepts concerning 
how to deal with trust in business (Rottger and Voss, 2008). Ultimately, this study should extend 
other approaches to trust production by offering a critical approach, and a novel research design. 
I begin the paper with a short background on shadow banks and the unravelling of trust in the 
summer of 2007.  With the shadow banking system in mind, I then theorise system trust drawing 
on the work of Giddens and Foucault. I draw on relevant literature to present a new model of 
trust, one that reads trust production as a series of discursive and material practices enacted by 
various actors. Finally, I propose a framework through which to understand how system trust in 
shadow banking was first produced then lost, backed by the discursive power of rating agencies. 
By examining trust in this way, trust production, as organised by institutions in the financial 
system, becomes more visible, more detailed and less nebulous than may have been considered 
to date.  
 
System trust and shadow finance 
 
Theorising system trust 
 
The financial system is ‘the business of trust’, (Knights et al, 2001), and it is even more so in 
modern times when daily turnover on the world’s foreign exchange markets far exceeds the 
annual level of world exports (Held and McGrew, 2000). Trust has always been a central 
element wherever credit (lending) takes place (Kincaid, 2006). Credit is derived from the Latin 
for ‘to believe’ (Kincaid, 2006). But how did so many financial actors come to believe in and 
trust the shadow banking world? A growing body of literature has evolved around the idea that 
modernity has been accompanied by a qualitative shift in trust relations (Giddens, 1994).  
Giddens (1990) offers system trust as a solution to the modern condition of risk and danger 
because of trust’s ability to compress space and time. System trust is a faceless, impersonal form 
of trust which we, the public, place in money, and increasingly in expert systems such as finance.  
Giddens argues that people are able to trust large, abstract systems through a process of 
disembedding, in which social relations are lifted out of their local contexts of interaction and 
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restructured across indefinite spans of time-space (Giddens, 1990; 21).  Expert systems – that is, 
the network of experts connecting across time and space within and between different fields – 
are disembedding mechanisms which provide us with ‘guarantees’ of expectations across 
distanciated time-space. Trust is, in part, an article of faith, based upon the experience that such 
expert systems generally work. What counts in any given situation where two actors confront 
one another is an imbalance of skills or information. In the case of the financial system, there is a 
perpetual imbalance concerning the tradable value of a financial asset at a particular moment in 
space and time.   
The other principal disembedding mechanism identified by Giddens is money. It is here that 
the unique link between finance and trust is truly forged. Money works to reduce complexity and 
manage expectations, when traditional symbols of trust and authority have given way to 
competence in risk management (Gilbert, 2005). Money needs constant ‘feedback’ but does not 
require specific built-in guarantees and is therefore incomparably easier to acquire than trust 
placed in strangers. Giddens emphasises that it is money as such which enjoys trust, rather than 
the individuals or organisations with whom particular transactions are carried out. Anyone who 
trusts in the stability of the value of money assumes that a system is functioning and places his 
trust in that function, not in people. This point becomes crucial in considering how trust ‘seized 
up’ within the global financial system.  
Lapavitsas contends that it is the state which regulates money and imbues it with trust, 
ultimately ‘lending’ trust to financial institutions (Lapavitsas, 2006). These financial institutions 
have differing influence over money and the trust that goes with it, becoming layered in a 
‘pyramid of power’ (Kincaid, 2006). The management of modern credit money draws on social 
power and trust invested in central banks (Lapavitsas, 2006). National central banks sit at the 
apex of the financial trust pyramid (Figure 1), providing guarantees to money and sustaining the 
trustworthiness of banks and financial companies at lower levels. Kincaid (2006; 41) refers to 
this provision of guarantees as “a socialisation of trust, backed by the power of the national 
state”.  
Because shadow banks sit outside of the regulatory system they also sit outside this formal 
mantle of trust. However, the power and influence of shadow banks was able to grow through 
system trust operating between financial institutions. Shadow banks were experts in opaque 
practices such as securitised lending through unregulated vehicles, knowledge that few in the 
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‘real’ banking system could  fathom (Tett, 2009). Since few were certain of how to value 
complex financial instruments, they looked for an overt sign of trust that investing in the shadow 
banking system was ‘just as good’ as depositing money in a real bank (McCulley, 2009). At this 
point, credit rating agencies stepped in as specialists in trust production (Zucker, 1986). They 
produced market-derived rating symbols, devices supplied to reduce the cost of trust formation 
(Yandle, 2008).  
 
Figure 1: (Adapted) Financial trust system with shadow system (Author)2 
 
 
 
 
Theorising trust production 
 
                                                 
2 The pyramid has been adapted from Costas Lapavitsas’s presentation of trust built socially through the credit 
system (See Lapavitsas, C. 2006), which he in turn adapted from the Unoist Marxist tradition. Lapavitsas describes 
the credit system as a pyramid-shaped, layered set of institutions, markets and assets. Lapavitsas’ focus was the flow 
of trust in wholesale capital markets, i.e. central banks, money markets, banks and trade credit. I have adapted the 
suggested original to include a range of mainstream financial institutions that cater to a lay audience, and have 
further included a ‘shadow pyramid’ of trust showing the dual position of rating agencies. 
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As the preceding discussion demonstrates, system trust allows us to interpret the 
processes that produce trust. However, it leaves opaque the precise and non-discursive practices 
employed by system actors in order to produce trust. Here, it is useful to draw on insights from 
Foucault’s  extensive body of work, primarily that concerned with power produced through 
discourse (Foucault, 1969, Foucault, 1976). Like Giddens, Foucault establishes a direct link 
between power and expertise, but Foucault makes expert systems the primary source of power, 
submitting that discursive strategies are forms of expert knowledge (Foucault, 1981).  Foucault 
defined society by its multiplicity of fields of knowledge, highlighting the production of 
meanings, the strategies of power and the propagation of knowledge. Discourse is everything 
written/spoken about a specialist practice/knowledge, ‘controlling’ those who lack specialist 
knowledge. Specialists produce statements about their practice, ‘regimes of truth’ defined by 
the ‘discursive rules’ of their field (Faubion, 1994). In this way, the experts at rating agencies 
produced a discursive regime of truth about the trustworthiness of ‘Triple A’ rated credit 
instruments, despite the inclusion of less trustworthy ‘subprime’ mortgage debt within those 
instruments.   
In order to fully understand how sales outfits such as rating agencies were able to 
simulate trust production for the shadow financial system in the way that the state did for the 
visible financial system, it is necessary to understand the wide range of trust practices that a 
credit rating agency is able to enact within financial systems. In order to consider the 
underlying practices involved in producing system trust in money and financial expertise (Table 
1), I have proposed a model for trust production in financial systems guided by Foucault’s 
notion of the knowledge/power apparatus, an idea later developed and given more detail by 
Jäger (2001). 
Once the underlying practices which make up the financial system are uncovered and 
brought to light, it is possible to see that trust practices are linked with the materialisations of 
financial returns, as well as the discursive statements asserting value and performance records 
recording that financial return. Therefore, a banking institution (shadow or real) wishing to be 
trusted will engage in trust practices such as reporting their investment performance 
(discursive) and in expertly managing investments (non-discursive actions). If the institution 
goes on to produce financial returns, it will be trusted. If it does not produce financial returns, it 
will be mistrusted. But the crux of the matter with shadow banking was that its products were 
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new and complex, with no track record. So the meaning of ‘performance’ and ‘value’ was 
elusive, and could not be precisely located (Lanchester, 2008). Once those meanings were 
brought into question, no one was sure of the value of assets, and system trust unravelled.  
 
Table 1: Financial Services Trust Practice Framework (Author) 
 
TRUST PRACTICE FRAMEWORK 
 
1. Protecting  2. Guaranteeing 3. Aligning
 
4. Making visible 
“We represent our 
customers’ best interests 
since they bear the risk” 
“We are certain of 
delivering set results 
in a set time frame” 
“We associate with other 
trust codes and systems” 
 
“We are truthful, thus 
transparent about how 
we do things” 
 
Building wealth or 
reducing debt 
 
Managing risk while 
providing customers with 
exit strategies 
 
Assigning high/low trust 
actors e.g. custodian to 
look after funds 
 
Respecting property e.g. 
installing and monitoring 
customer data protection  
 
Adopting an industry role 
as ‘consumer champion’ 
 
Keeping promises, 
honouring contracts, 
repaying money 
 
Producing certification 
of competence, 
expertise 
 
Monitoring system 
soundness 
 
Assessing 
effectiveness of 
policies 
 
Enlisting third party 
endorsement,  
recommendation, 
ratings, warranties, 
seals of approval 
 
Adopting standards and 
codes of ‘best practice’ 
e.g. auditing 
 
Complying with law and 
regulation 
 
Foregoing competitive 
imitation 
 
Recognising and 
supporting customer 
loyalty 
 
Negotiating against stated 
expectations,  with 
willingness to 
compromise 
 
Supporting socially 
responsible behaviour 
 
Making and pricing 
accessible, transparent 
products and services 
 
Making transparent 
contract terms 
 
Measuring financial 
performance, reporting 
frequently, honestly 
 
Submitting or subscribing 
to monitoring and 
assessment 
 
Giving customers a voice, 
listening to and acting on 
complaints 
 
Apologising for failings 
(accepting vulnerability); 
making amends 
5. Simplifying
 
“We are expert enough to explain what we do in plain terms” 
 
Seeking binary divisions, selecting and omitting messages, clarifying financial jargon, explaining and educating 
on technical occurrences in markets, ranking product providers, separating opinion from fact. 
Discursive tools include: websites, fact sheets, brochures, websites, press releases, speeches, commentary, case 
studies, targets, forecasts, statements, audits, surveys, ratings
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The Case Study: credit agencies and trust production 
 
Over the past decade, debt capital markets became vastly more complex. At the turn of 
the century the ‘dot com’ boom collapsed. Regulators lowered the cost of borrowing to keep 
economies buoyant, and the credit market became the new game in town (Tett, 2009). New and 
highly-innovative financial instruments were introduced, and as they proliferated, eventually a 
dual system arose. Despite state emphasis on transparency, (Keegan, 2007; 8), experts in the 
visible financial system were setting up ‘wonderfully opaque’ financial vehicles in the shadow 
financial system, thus avoiding regulatory scrutiny. Hedge funds exploded on to the scene 
trading in various forms of creative financing (Tett, 2009). Highly-levered lending and 
investment institutions such as structured investment vehicles (SIVs), hedge funds, leveraged 
buyout funds, collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), investment conduits, specialist monoline 
insurers, and increasingly, levered mortgage and investment banks proliferated, creating a 
shadow financial system (McCulley, 2009).  
The shadow financial system is primarily differentiated from the visible financial system 
because of its unregulated status. It does not enjoy the formal mechanisms that generate trust 
between the public and the visible financial system. ‘Trust at a distance’ becomes an even greater 
issue because these instruments were highly-innovative, therefore untested (Jones et al., 2009), 
highly-complex, therefore comprehensible only to specialists and largely unregulated, therefore 
invisible on company balance sheets. Credit ratings agencies played a significant role in the 
growth of this ‘invisible’ derivatives market by acting as the most visible, recognisable and 
formal trust mechanism for high-risk debt. Investors did not always understand the complex new 
instruments behind this creative financing, but complexity was vastly simplified by ratings 
assigned to these new instruments by ratings agencies. Credit ratings such as ‘AAA’ appeared 
unbiased and served to simplify complex financial instruments, giving them a veneer of 
transparency and standardisation. Ratings were backed up by massive research, which was a key 
element in the rating agencies’ sales pitch” (Tett, 2009). In a largely unregulated market, credit 
ratings ultimately served as a proxy for regulatory influence from the state. A Triple A 
‘anointment’ from a credit agency enabled operators in the shadow financial system to raise 
funds, real banks to extend loans to them, and investors to purchase complex instruments that 
paid great returns with minimum worry (Tett, 2009).  
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The visible and shadow financial systems became heavily interconnected, an entire 
system organised around mutual trust with the purpose of reaping profit. In record time, financial 
innovation became the fastest-growing segment of the rating agencies’ business. Much of that 
business includes transactions designed to capture particular ratings (Partnoy, 1999). The 
increased availability of prime-rated instruments in the shadow banking system attracted 
investors from all over. Shadow financial entities and visible financial institutions intermingled, 
yet shadow entities were rarely acknowledged or reported on by the mainstream (Tett, 2009).  
The lack of external scrutiny meant that, over time, the global credit rating system was 
able to institutionalise several problems and weaknesses. Firstly, rating agencies were paid by 
investment banks that issued debt instruments in the first place, In this biased system, agencies 
had incentives to give higher ratings to more instruments in order to earn higher fees from 
volume (Yandle, 2008). Secondly, the ratings agencies’ method of valuing complex financial 
instruments was so opaque and difficult to fathom, that few were in a position to contest the 
assigned ratings. Tett (2009; 111) likens  ratings agencies to “priests in the medieval church”, 
speaking the “equivalent of financial Latin, which few in their investor congregation actually 
understood”.  Thirdly, global three rating agencies were effectively a ‘government-mandated’ 
cartel (Yandle, 2008; 352), with many countries promoting regulatory recognition of rating 
agencies (Mutti, 2004). Finally, while the shadow system did have the benefit of a state-
produced safety net as was the case in the visible financial system, each system was becoming 
heavily invested in the other, steadily becoming intertwined with Triple A debt instruments 
offering the portal from one world to another.  
The shadow financial system increased visibility very suddenly in June 2007, when two 
highly-levered Bear Stearns hedge funds collapsed, initiating the breakdown of subprime‐backed 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) (Brown et al., 2008).  As the summer of 2007 wore on, 
panic in the credit markets intensified. Banks lost trust in hedge funds, demanding they begin 
posting more collateral for loans. Many hedge funds could not comply. Along with other 
investors, they began dumping any assets that might contain default risk, causing asset prices to 
fall. This made banks even more nervous, and they began hoarding cash. The cost of borrowing 
rose until the interbank lending market effectively collapsed as real banks became reluctant to 
lend to each other (Yandle, 2008). As Tett (2009; 217) explains, banks either “needed that cash, 
or did not trust each other – or both”. An entire network of ‘shadow banks’ suddenly discovered 
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that its lifeblood had been cut off (Tett, 2009). Ratings no longer reflected competitive market 
forces (Yandle, 2008). Consequently, in October, Moody’s cut its rating on billions of medium-
risk mortgage-backed bonds, warning that it might also downgrade billions more which carried 
the Triple A rating. A few days later, Standard and Poor’s put a slew of CDOs under review, 
followed hot on its heels by Fitch. An entire structured credit edifice had been built on the 
assumption that Triple A was ultra-safe. Now the term ‘AAA’ had now lost its discursive 
meaning. The cut in credit ratings acted a ‘trust solvent’ (Yandle, 2008; 343), causing trust in the 
shadow financial system to evaporate into thin air. 
In order to offer some critical reflection on trust production as a mechanism in debt capital 
markets, I have chosen Standard & Poor’s, one of the world’s largest rating agencies as a site 
where members of the debt markets subject themselves and one another to various practices. I 
will explore selected excerpts from the discourses deployed by Standard & Poor’s between 2005 
and 2007 when the global financial crisis erupted. My aim is to apply the trust practice 
framework in a discursive analysis of these selected texts in order to develop a closer 
understanding of trust production as a process in complex financial systems. I am specifically 
interested in understanding which trust practices ratings agencies deploy and which they do not; 
how these practices relate to the mass production of mistrust that occurred in the global financial 
system in the summer of 2007, and finally, what patterns of power and powerlessness emerged in 
respect of ratings agencies and other discursive actors named within discourses of Triple A credit 
worthiness. 
 
The Empirical Study: discourse analysis, methodology and method 
 
Discourse analysis 
Jäger (2001) provides a terminology and methodology for discourse analysis. Whereas other 
qualitative methodologies might explore themes, Jäger identifies ‘discourse strands’. These 
themes or discourse strands operate on various ‘discursive planes’, which are fields of activity 
such as the sciences, politics, media, education, everyday life, business life or administration. 
Discourse strands are themselves comprised of ‘discourse fragments’ or texts. Jäger prefers the 
term discourse fragment to ‘text’ since texts can address several themes and thus contain several 
discourse fragments. A text can contain various discourse fragments which emerge in an 
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entangled form, which he refers to as a ‘discursive entanglement’. Jäger describes a discursive 
event as one that is emphasised politically, generally by the media. Discursive events influence 
the direction and quality of the discourse strand to which they belong to a greater or less extent. 
The identification of discursive events is also important for the analysis of discourse strands, 
because sketching them marks out the contours of the discursive context to which a current 
discourse strand relates. Finally, a ‘discourse position’ refers to a specific ideological location of 
a person or a medium. These discourse positions can only be revealed as the result of discourse 
analyses. 
Jäger sets out five steps for conducting discourse analysis. The first step entails a brief 
characterisation of the sector and of the discourse plane. The second step involves establishing 
and processing the material base or archive. The third step in Jäger’s approach to discourse 
analysis involves structure analysis, which is evaluating processed material vis à vis the 
discourse strand. The next step involves a fine analysis of one or several articles or discourse 
fragments, typical of the sector under exploration. The final step in Jäger’s approach is an overall 
analysis of the sector concerned. Jäger does not propose slavish adherence to his five steps as 
variations are always possible. However, he suggests paying keen attention to dealing with the 
discourse analysis of the discourse strand at issue, of the sector concerned, on a discourse plane. 
He also points out that every discourse strand has a history, a present and a future. Thus, a 
through approach to research would involve analysing longer time frames of discursive processes 
in order to reveal their strength, the density of the entanglement of the respective discourse 
strands with others, changes, the fractures, drying up and re-emergence (Jäger, 2001). I have 
applied Jäger’s steps in analysing select documents relating to Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s 
between [specified years], leading up to the global financial crisis.  
 
Establishing and processing Standard & Poor’s material 
 
Standard & Poor’s is a US-based, global ratings agency. Frequently known as ‘S&P’, the 
firm celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2007, though its history dates back more than 150 years. 
Standard & Poor’s is also widely known for maintaining one of the most widely followed indices 
of large-cap American stocks: the S&P 500 (Standard & Poor's, 2011). In 2009, S&P published 
more than 870,000 new and revised credits ratings.  Currently, the company claims to rate more 
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than US$32 trillion in outstanding debt (Standard & Poor's, 2011). Ratings agency analysts are 
paid relatively modest salaries, have limited upward mobility and may responsible for tracking 
the credit quality of scores of companies. Yet they are generally paid significantly less than 
equity analysts and large agencies such as S&P tend to have high levels of staff turnover 
(Partnoy, 1999).  
Generally, when S&P is asked to rate a new instrument, representatives of the issuer meet 
with the agency’s analysts and disclose the facts they believe are relevant. Ideally, the analyst 
then has a few weeks to apply the relevant statistical model, and submit a report to an internal 
rating committee, which will meet to vote on the appropriate rating, Triple A or otherwise. In the 
case of the sophisticated instruments in the derivatives market, S&P and its competitors have 
developed proprietary systems and models for analysing these complex structures. In the case of 
the Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS) market, for example, S&P has its own 
criteria for rating securitisations backed by commercial mortgages. The agency begins with the 
underlying real estate, since it is important to ascertain the property’s income-producing 
capability for the life of the rated transaction (Standard & Poor's, 2004). After being engaged to 
rate a transaction, Standard & Poor’s analysts will typically visit a representative sample of 
properties, meet with management, analyse historical and current financial statements, and 
review all third-party reports.  
The modeling assumptions developed by S&P and other ratings agencies are generally 
published in documents that are made available to borrowers and lenders, and there is a fair 
degree of transparency in that many of these documents are available on the company’s website. 
The models are scrutinised by analysts in the markets, and S&P and its peers will periodically 
revise these models to reflect newly-available data or application of new statistical theory. While 
the models may be based on mathematical equations, the final credit rating is still subject to the 
opinion of a committee, hence the products produced by S&P in the form of ratings are based on 
opinion, and as with many financial models, they attempt to project future probability based on 
data from past financial events.  
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Fine analysis of selected texts  
 
Despite the significant agency power held by firms such as Standard & Poor’s, it was 
impossible for the public and for regulators to ignore the fact that Standard & Poor’s together 
with its main competitor, had given Enron, the energy company, a good rating just four days 
before it collapsed in one of the largest bankruptcies in US history (Mutti, 2004). While 
regulatory scrutiny of rating agencies increased after Enron, leading to new legislation, Standard 
& Poor’s worked assiduously to represent the agency’s work as public information rather 
commercial advice. To this end, Standard and Poor’s lawyers published a memorandum 
establishing legal as well as constitutional arguments for S&P’s deliberate positioning as a 
‘financial publisher’. The memo is excerpted below: 
 
July 2005 
Standard & Poor’s Memorandum  
The First Amendment Protections Afforded to Rating Agencies 
 
“In a wide array of circumstances, state and federal courts have consistently 
recognized that S&P and other rating agencies are entitled to the same First Amendment 
protections as other financial publishers such as Business Week and The Wall Street Journal. 
These decisions have been based on widespread judicial recognition that, at their 
core, rating agencies perform First Amendment functions by gathering information, 
analysing it and disseminating opinions about it — in the form of credit ratings and 
commentary — to the general public… All of S&P’s published rating actions are also made 
available to the public for free on its Web site, along with thousands of articles of fixed 
income-related commentary. 
…Courts have consistently extended the protections of the First Amendment to S&P 
and other rating agencies. Most recently, the judge overseeing the multidistrict Enron 
litigation recognized that S&P’s credit ratings deserve the “constitutional breathing space” 
afforded by the First Amendment because they are “opinions” about important public issues 
distributed “to the world.”  
…In recognizing these full First Amendment protections, courts have concluded that 
rating agencies are fundamentally different from other market participants, such as public 
accountants, who do not enjoy the same First Amendment protections…”(Poor's, 2005). 
 
Two interesting aspects of trust and power emerge in the reading of this text. First of all, 
Standard & Poor’s appears to argue that its role in debt capital markets is less powerful and less 
influential than subsequent events show it to be. Secondly, and perhaps more interestingly, is the 
fact that the company has chosen to weave in an important American narrative, invoking its right 
to freedom of speech as enshrined in the US constitution.  
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The second discursive strand selected is a news article carried by Bloomberg News, the 
financial publisher, replicating a ratings action deployed by Standard & Poor’s  in October 2006. 
The ratings action concerns Bear Stearns, the investment bank which eventually spiraled into 
trouble the following year. The discursive strand is selected to demonstrate S&P’s positive view 
on the company less than a year before its subsequent downgrade: 
 
27 October 2006, Bloomberg News 
 
‘Merrill Lynch, Goldman, Bear Stearns Ratings Boosted (Update3)’ 
 
“ Merrill Lynch & Co., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Bear Stearns Cos., three of 
the five biggest U.S. securities firms, had their long-term credit ratings raised by Standard & 
Poor's Corp. on improved risk management…Bear Stearns advanced to A+, one below its 
bigger rivals. 
…The rating changes will help reduce the companies' cost of borrowing as they use 
debt to boost trading with the firms' own money…“Risk management at these firms has 
improved substantially,'' [Brad] Hintz [of Bernstein Co] said. ``Still, are they taking on too 
much risk by relying on such unorthodox capital?'' 
[James] Keegan [of American Century Investments] said he was ``substantially'' 
underweight the sectors, meaning that he held less than half the amount of brokerage bonds 
than are in investor indexes. 
``We don't see a lot of upside,'' he said in an interview. ``The ratings companies, by 
their nature, tend to validate what the market already knows.'' 
…S&P said…Bear Stearns's upgrade reflects ‘`relatively low profit volatility, 
conservative management and cost flexibility’…”(Bloomberg, 2006). 
 
 
In many ways, 2006 was a banner year for rating agencies. There was unprecedented 
issuance of CDOs and other complex instruments. There was plenty of supposedly healthy Triple 
A debt about, and a hungry market, eager to gobble it up. Yet what is significant about this 
second discursive strand ‘upgrading’ Bear Stearns is the seed of doubt planted by the two 
analysts who are also quoted by the Bloomberg journalists. The first analyst acknowledges that 
firms such as Bear Stearns have improved their risk management processes, yet, when he refers 
to ‘unorthodox capital’, he is concerned that the bank may be over-exposed to the wrong kind of 
risk. The second analyst states that he is ‘underweight’ on companies such as Bear Stearns 
compared to his peers in the investment industry. He makes it clear that he sees no reason to 
increase his holding in the near future because S&P has effectively provided ‘stale news’. 
Meanwhile, 2006 was a particularly busy year for S&P as it was just one of the ratings agencies 
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to revise certain models used to evaluate high-risk instruments such as CDOs (Nomura, 2006). It 
had become patently clear that their models failed to accurately predict the performance of 
securities tied to risky mortgages (US Senate, 2011). Significantly, S&P – together with it s peers 
– did not immediately incorporate their revised models into credit ratings for a wide-range of 
derivative products. Instead of sending an early signal to the market in July 2006 of the 
deepening problems with high risk mortgages and securities tied to them, the agencies waited 
until July of 2007, to begin a series of mass downgrades (US Senate, 2011).  The next excerpt 
comes from Reuters newswire, describing the latest set of downgrades as events move toward 
crisis mode: 
 
13 July 2007 
Reuters 
CDO drama may spark bargain hunt after fire sales 
 
“…As pension funds and insurers prepare to possibly sell billions of dollars in bonds 
tied to dicey mortgages after ratings agencies downgraded them, Wall Street looks ready to 
buy what Main Street investors may cast off. 
"We are hoping for that moment when the baby gets thrown out with the bath 
water," said Mitch Stapley, chief fixed- income officer for Fifth Third Asset Management, 
which has $12.7 billion invested in debt. 
…Before the buying is likely to begin, investors of all stripes said prices need to fall 
more. Already this week, the benchmark ABX indexes, used by investors to hedge subprime 
mortgage risks, slumped to record lows while spreads on more liquid junk bonds widened, 
but not by the same magnitude. 
"We've already seen them drop 50 cents on the dollar and if they lose their ratings, a 
lot of pension funds are going to have to blow that paper out. And that will be ugly," said 
John Mauldin, a hedge fund investor at Millennium Wave Advisors. 
It's also an event that could reverberate through global financial markets, unleashing 
a wave of selling of a wide array of riskier assets from stocks to corporate bonds. 
…Mohamed El-Erian, the president and chief executive officer of Harvard 
Management Co., the world's largest educational endowment fund, said, "The big question 
now is whether the recent move by rating agencies to downgrade several instruments will 
result in forced sales by rating-constrained investors who had sought to benefit from the 
rating arbitrage,” (Reuters, 2007). 
 
The sudden shock of those downgrades contributed to the collapse of the secondary 
markets for subprime residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs), left investors holding suddenly unmarketable securities, and helped 
precipitate the financial crisis. However, the ‘last straw’ for many investors was the loss of 
confidence in Bear Stearns, the global investment bank, which already suffered the collapse of its 
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two highly-levered Bear Stearns hedge funds collapsed (CDOs) (Brown et al., 2008).  Standard 
& Poor’s ratings actions on Bear Stearns served only to feed the panic, illustrated by the next 
excerpt:  
 
3 August 2007, Bloomberg Business Week 
‘Standard & Poor's Ratings Direct’ 
  
“Aug. 3, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it revised its outlook on Bear Stearns 
(BSC) to negative from stable. Standard & Poor's also said that it affirmed its A+/A-1 issuer 
credit rating on Bear Stearns as well as its ratings on various Bear Stearns affiliates.  
Notwithstanding the challenges Bear Stearns currently faces, S&P believes the 
company's liquidity is strong. "Still, the negative outlook reflects our concerns about recent 
developments and their potential to hurt Bear Stearns' performance for an extended period," 
notes S&P credit analyst Diane Hinton. "We believe Bear Stearns' reputation has suffered 
from the widely publicized problems of its managed hedge funds, leaving the company a 
potential target of litigation from investors who have suffered substantial losses."  
 “…The ratings could be lowered if large losses were to be incurred over the next few 
quarters or if earnings failed to stabilize at a satisfactory level beyond the next few quarters, 
which we expect will be—at best—difficult ones for the company. On the other hand, if Bear 
Stearns can overcome current challenges and effect a more rapid recovery than we currently 
anticipate, the rating outlook could be revised back to stable”(Bloomberg, 2007). 
 
On first reading, the story appears to carry good news and bad news – while S&P’s has 
downgraded Bear Stearns, it maintains that the bank’s liquidity is ‘strong’. However, the 
intertextuality of this particular discursive strand is important. As the next excerpt from AP Dow 
Jones news wires shows, the market saw only the negative and Bear Stearns was, all too soon, to 
face its demise: 
 
6 August 2007  
Dow Jones 
‘S&P says market overreacting to Bear Stearns outlook change’ 
 
“…The stock market overreacted after Standard & Poor's lowered its long-term 
outlook on Bear Stearns Cos.' credit ratings to negative Aug. 3, an S&P managing director 
said Monday.  
Shares of Bear Stearns fell by as much as $8.60 Monday… after losing more than $7 
on Friday, and are off about a third so far this year. The company failed to staunch the selloff 
despite holding a conference call Friday to defend its funding and earnings strength and 
firing one of its top executives over the weekend.  
"We think it's all overplayed," said Scott Sprinzen, an analyst at S&P's financial 
institutions rating group on Monday afternoon. "Our thinking in making the change was 
pretty modest in comparison to the wholesale readjustment the market seems to be making."  
…Sprinzen said S&P adjusted its outlook negatively only on Bear Stearns because 
of the collapse of two subprime mortgage-dominated hedge funds and problems at a third 
fund…”(Dow Jones, 2007). 
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Attempts by Standard & Poor’s to play down the effect of its earlier downgrade, only 
underscore the power of a rating agency’s ‘freedom of speech’, enshrined in the US constitution. 
A simple discursive shift from ‘stable’ to ‘negative’ deployed widespread mistrust in Bear 
Stearns and helped to spell the bank’s demise.  
 
Discussion 
 
The Standard & Poor’s discursive thread covering selected strands from 2005 to 2007 
help to uncover some of the practices of ratings agencies. In my view, these excerpts suggest 
ratings agencies in most trust practices hypothesised in the trust framework in Table 1. Most 
certainly, rating agencies engage in the act of guaranteeing. By publishing extensive analyses 
of company financial data and producing a rating from D through Triple A, rating agencies 
offer to ‘populate the future’, as impossible as this may be (Giddens, 1990). However, while 
rating agencies promote their Triple A guarantees, they are unwilling to accept commercial 
responsibility for what they say, which renders their ‘guarantee’ incomplete. When it comes to 
the act of making transparent, rating agencies are murkier still. On the one hand, agencies claim 
to publish information regarding the models they use to arrive at their decisions; yet their 
research and their ratings do not match. Standard & Poor’s hung on to revised models 
developed in 2006, failing to apply them until 2007, with unfortunate consequences.  
Rating agencies most certainly engage in the act of aligning: they receive regulatory 
backing in many countries which are active in debt capital markets. Rating agencies serve a 
vital, voluntary role in deregulated markets, where countries seek to avoid excessive regulation. 
In addition, rating agencies work closely with the world’s most powerful investment banks – 
among the best-known names in global finance. However, while this may produce trust in the 
activities of rating agencies, it has been pointed out elsewhere that in the measurement of 
investment risk investors are the one group that rating agencies ought to be aligned with, and 
indeed protecting, and yet this is the one group that agencies continually let down.   
The trust practice that rating agencies seem to perform most ably is the act of 
simplifying. Borrowers and lenders lean heavily of rating agencies to clarify and simplify the 
increasingly sophisticated and complex world of high-tech financial instruments. Not only do 
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market players seek clarity, they seem it quickly. Until the summer of 2007, the term ‘Triple A’ 
told the actors in both the visible and shadow financial systems everything they needed to 
know. It is these simple mnemonics ‘AAA’, ‘BBB’, ‘CCC’, that have delivered substantial 
power to rating agencies, a power backed by the state, which has encoded ‘Triple A’ into its 
requirements for investment and pension funds all over the world. And yet, curiously, the trust 
practice that the state has not enshrined is that rating agencies should engage, first and foremost, 
in the most powerful trust practice of all – protecting investors.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Ratings agencies operated in both the real and shadow banking system, creating an 
active market for trust. However, ratings agencies primarily operate at the discursive end of the 
trust practice framework guaranteeing, aligning, making visible and simplifying. Ratings 
agencies provide third party endorsement by guaranteeing a company’s ability to pay its debt. 
They align the market by issuing credit rating standards. They make financial institutions more 
visible by publishing research on company performance. Above all, ratings agencies translate 
and simplify the meaning of complex financial instruments by offering symbols that investors 
can easily identify. Rating agencies are merely third party intermediaries. The trust practices 
they engage in are varied, but their agency power is primarily discursive. They do not engage in 
the most powerful financial trust practice of all, that of protecting and safeguarding deposits of 
money. This is an important lesson to understand when assigning future trust roles in complex 
financial systems.  
This has been a preliminary study into the discursive and material practices of actors 
within the financial system. Discourse analysis is a highly subjective methodology and the 
selection of discursive strands and the decision to edit and excerpt them will reflect some 
degree of bias, which can be addressed, in part, by an increasing number of researchers bringing 
their different subjectivities to the theme chosen here. Nor do I claim that my observations of 
the flaws in the credit rating system are new. However, from an organisational perspective, I 
believe the trust practice framework provides a useful mechanism for applying and measuring 
an organisation’s ability to produce both trust and mistrust, equipping researchers and 
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practitioners to uncover, recognise and address systemic flaws particular during times of 
significant shift, as has happened in debt capital markets since 2000. 
From an organisational perspective, the trust practice framework also highlights that the 
production of mistrust can also be a deliberate strategy within organisations and systems. In the 
case of debt capital markets, just as a Triple A rating produces trust, a negative ratings action 
such as the downgrade to Bear Stearns on 3 August 2007, deploys mistrust. Mistrust may be as 
necessary to the human condition as trust is, but its repercussions can be powerful and 
deleterious. If we hand over mistrust production to any player in our organisation or system, 
then we must acknowledge the nature of the power we hand over to these actors, and ensure 
that there are checks and balances to their power. 
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